FLEEING residents from Sake, Eastern DRC alongside SANDF peacekeepers on February 7, 2024. Until recently, South Africa claimed a proud record of peace-making and peacekeeping on the African continent. The current DRC imbroglio is the latest in a series of political and security sector failures, says the writer. Picture: AFP
Prof. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk
NATIONAL security is the first and most important obligation of government.
It involves not just the safety of the country and its citizens. It is a matter of guarding national values and interests from internal and external dangers.
According to the South African constitution, “national security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life”.
In addition, the South African government is committed to a foreign policy which it says prioritises a peaceful and prosperous Africa and which contributes to a just and equitable world. Its national interest framework document, released in 2023, is a further expression of these strategic aims.
To achieve these objectives, democratic South Africa consciously reshaped the apartheid-era defence and security systems. The security sector currently consists of the South African National Defence Force, the South African Police Service, the intelligence services (State Security, Crime Intelligence and Defence Intelligence), various government departments including Justice, Foreign and Home Affairs, decision-making bodies such as the National Security Council (NSC), and oversight bodies such as Parliament, the Ombud, and the Inspector-General of Intelligence.
Decision-making relating to national security is the responsibility of the Executive, where the President as the Commander-in-Chief can employ members of the security sector to assist with domestic upheaval, national disasters or external peace support operations.
In deploying the instruments of national security he must consult and report to Parliament. The executive is supported in this role by the minister in the Presidency responsible for intelligence, the NSC, and a National Security Advisor.
South Africa’s involvement in the attempts to address the violent conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where it tragically lost 14 SANDF soldiers, has cast a sharp light on the capacity of its security sector to achieve its strategic national and foreign security objectives.
Until recently, South Africa claimed a proud record of peace-making and peacekeeping on the African continent. Presidents Mandela and Mbeki and several South African diplomats and mediators were involved in processes that brought relief to the people of central Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, and the island states of the Indian Ocean.
However, under the ruinous leadership of President Zuma (2009-2018) factions within the ruling party politicised the security sector.
Several investigations, including the so-called Mufamadi and Africa Reports, have revealed that beyond political ineptitude, a political and criminal cabal exploited and prevented the investment of required resources to maintain the sector’s capacity, particularly intelligence and the military.
Domestically, the Marikana massacre in 2012, the so-called insurrection of 2021 in KwaZulu-Natal, the dismantling of the country’s railways, and the more recent troubles with illegal mining including the violent Zama Zamas and the loss of life at Stilfontein, demonstrate the failures of the national security sector to anticipate and manage crises.
In the rest of Africa, the tide has turned and South Africa has lost its ability to be seen, and to act, as a continental peacemaker and peacekeeper.
The current DRC imbroglio is the latest in a series of political and security sector failures. It follows earlier attempts at African peace enforcement. In the Central African Republic in 2013, during the ‘Battle for Bangui’, South Africa lost 13 soldiers with many wounded, and in Mozambique in 2021-2024, South Africa, which led the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM), lost several soldiers.
SAMIM was able to stabilise Northern Mozambique for a period but failed to resolve the crisis which gave rise to the actions of violent extremists. At the time of SAMIM’s withdrawal, in 2024, Mozambique exploded in post-election violence.
It is also not a coincidence that with the redeployment of SADC to the DRC in 2023 to undertake peace enforcement, under the flag of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), the Eastern part of the DRC exploded in violent conflict, with no end in sight.
These experiences raise the following two issues:
Firstly, what must be done to recover South Africa’s ability to anticipate, manage and resolve domestic and continental crises? The shortcomings of the national security decision-making architecture are ultimately political and must be addressed at the strategic level.
Secondly, how can the capacity of its security sector to protect the nation from harm and to support continental peace-making, peace enforcement and peacekeeping, be recovered?
A properly constructed national security edifice – consisting of well-trained personnel, adequate resources, and directed by mutually interlocking strategies on advancing the national interest, national development, national security, and South Africa’s role in Africa and globally – is needed for the country to play a meaningful role in improving the lives of its people at home, but also continentally, and in the global South.
This challenge is beyond the scope of the Government of National Unity. Not many citizens are confident that the bickering politicians will unite around a common understanding of the national interest and invest resources to recover the security sector. The envisaged National Dialogue is perhaps the most appropriate vehicle for South Africa to examine and resolve this challenge.
* Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, PhD, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa.
** The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of The African.